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Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 960657-CA
CHARLES M. BOVA,
Argument Priority 15
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce signed on
September 17, 1996, by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge of the
Third District Court for Summit County, State of Utah, and entered
of record on September 19, 1996. (R.1658)

Plaintiff's motion for

new trial dated January 19, 1996 (R. 1186-7) was denied by order
dated January 29, 1997, and entered January 31, 1997. (R. 1859)
Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed February 27, 1997, (R. 1862)
and Plaintiff's Notice of Cross Appeal was filed March 6, 1997 (R.
2088) .

There have been no prior appeals on the merits, although

both parties filed appeals before Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial

was ruled upon by the trial court. These appeals were dismissed by
this Court as premature in Number 960657-CA.1
Jurisdiction is based on Title 78-2a-3(2) (h) Utah Code, and on
Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH CITATIONS
TO RECORD FOR PRESERVATION FOR ISSUES FOR APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in double

assessing Husband for Sea Doo debt and household items, and for
assessing Husband for IRA funds expended for the benefit of both
parties? (R. 1233-34)
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing

to consider the expense of capital gains taxes on the marital home
and thereby assessing all of such taxes to Husband? (R. 1232)
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering

Husband to assume all responsibility for the home equity line of
credit where $11,500.00 of such debt resulted

from the trial

court's excessive temporary support order? (R. 1236-7, 1239-40)
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing

to impute full time work income to Wife for purposes of computing
child support and alimony? (R. 1239-40)
5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering

child support by imputing 100 percent of income at the maximum
x

The parties filed premature notices of appeal on October 17,
1996 (R. 1759) and October 29, 1996 (R. 1793) while Plaintiff's
Motion for New Trial was still pending. This Court dismissed such
appeal for lack of jurisdiction in Number 960657-CA on December 19,
1996. The remittur was received by the trial court on January 29,
1997, on which date it entered its order denying Plaintiff's Motion
for New Trial.
2

table amount to Husband and zero to Wife where Husband's income did
not meet the maximum amount and Wife had substantial income?
(R. 1244-45)
6.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not

awarding the tax dependency exemptions to Husband? (R. 1251)
7.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding

Wife attorney's fees where Wife was without need, Husband was
without ability to pay and adequate findings were not entered?
!

(R. 1249-51)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
An award of alimony or child support by the trial court will
not

be

disturbed

so long

as the trial

court

exercises

its

discretion within the standards set by this state's appellate
courts. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 79 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont
Haumont,

P.2d

877

793 P.2d 423 (Utah App. 1990); Breinholt

(Utah App. 1995) .

v. Breinholt,

v.
905

The trial court's valuation and

distribution of marital property similarly will not be disturbed
absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.

Munns v.

Munns,

790 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1990) .
One standard set by Utah appellate courts is that trial courts
must adhere to the requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52
which states:

"In all actions tried upon the facts without a

jury[,] ... the court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon."

This requirement

allows a reviewing court to discern the trial court's reasoning
process and follow its analysis as it equitably distributes the
parties' assets.

See Rucker

v. Dalton,

3

598 P. 2d 1336, 1338 (Utah

1979) ("findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary

facts to disclose

the steps by which the ultimate

conclusion on each factual issue was reached") . Furthermore, under
Rule 52, divorce cases are the only category in which findings of
fact and conclusions of law may not be waived.
52(c).

Potter

v. Potter,

Utah R.Civ.P.

845 P.2d 272, 273-4 (Utah App. 1993).

While the trial court enjoys broad discretion in matters of
divorce,

such authority

does not

extend

to an arbitrary

and

unreasonable power to disregard credible, uncontradicted evidence
and make findings inconsistent therewith and issue an order based
King

thereon.

v. King,

478 P.2d 492, 25 Utah 2d 163, 168 (1970) .

The proceedings are in equity and the appellate court may review
questions of both law and fact, the very purpose of which is to
rectify errors where the evidence does not support the findings or
where it clearly preponderates against them. id. / Utah Const. ,
VIII,

Sec.

9.

Art.

Due to the advantaged position of the trial court in

close proximity to the parties and the witnesses, in the practical
application of this rule there is a presumption of correctness of
the trial court's findings and judgment with the burden upon the
appellant to show they are in error and the appellate court must be
convinced
Interest

that
of

a manifest

K.K.H.,

injustice

has been done. State

in

Utah, 610 P.2d 849 (1980).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Title

3 0-3-5

Utah Code, as amended.

See Exhibit

A of

addendum.
Title

78-45-7 Utah Code, as amended.

addendum.

4

See Exhibit B of

26 U.S.C. § 1.

See Exhibit C of addendum.

26 U.S.C. § 1034. See Exhibit D of addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal of the trial court's Decree of Divorce, and
particularly its orders concerning property distribution, debt and
tax liability allocation, alimony, child support and attorney's
fees.
2.

Course of the Proceedings.

Plaintiff/Respondent
August 3, 1994. (R. 1)

(Wife) filed this action for divorce on

The case was tried on October 24, 25 and

26, 1995, by the Honorable Frank G. Noel.

The trial court entered

minute entries stating its decision on December 14, 1995 (R. 114449) and May 14, 1996 (R.1360-4).

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and the Decree of Divorce were entered on September 19, 1996.
(R. 1633-1670)

Plaintiff's motion for new trial dated January 19,

1996 (R. 1186-7) was denied by order entered January 31, 1997. (R.
1859)

Defendant then filed this appeal on February 27, 1997 (R.

1862) and Plaintiff cross-appealed on March 6, 1997. (R. 2088)
3.

Disposition in the District Court.

The trial court granted each party a divorce and entered
orders

concerning

child

support,

alimony,

debt

and

property

allocation and attorney's fees in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce.
4.
Plaintiff,

Statement of Relevant Facts.
hereinafter

called
5

"Wife",

and

Defendant,

hereinafter called "Husband", were married on June 28, 1980. (R.
1634)

They have two sons, Mikell Bova, born March 8, 1984, and

Christopher Bova, born May 17, 1987. (R. 1635, 1882)
During

the

course

of

the

marriage

Husband

engaged

in

extramarital affairs which resulted in the breakup of the marriage
relationship. (R. 1634)

Each party was granted a divorce from the

other based upon irreconcilable differences. (R. 1659)
Wife is a registered nurse who at the time of trial was
employed by Kipp and Christian as a nurse paralegal.

(R. 1638)

Husband has a medical degree with board certification in emergency
medicine and sports medicine and at the time of trial worked as an
independent contractor for the Spine Center in West Valley City.
(R. 2262-2265)
CUSTODY - VISITATION
After a hotly contested custody battle, and following the
trial

testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart who recommended

full

custody of the children be awarded to Wife, the parties entered
into a stipulation wherein the parties were awarded joint legal
custody with Wife to have physical custody and the exclusive right
to make decisions regarding activities of the children, including,
medical

issues,

schooling,

social

activities,

and

sports

activities. (R. 2054-2060)
Husband was awarded extensive visitation
alia,

the right

Wednesday

to have the children

on one alternating

after

including,
school

week until before

inter

commencing

school

on the

following Monday and to have the children commencing Thursday after
6

school until before school on the following Monday on the next
alternating week.

During the school vacation period Husband would

receive the children at 1:00 p.m. on Wednesday or Thursday of the
alternating week in lieu of the after school time.

The parties

agreed to the holiday and birthday schedule of Section 30-2-35,
Utah Code Annotated, and Husband was also awarded four weeks of
summer visitation.

(R. id.,

1636-1637, Finding of Fact number 5)

As part of the custody/visitation stipulation it was "also
agreed that, irrespective of the amount of time that the defendant
has with the children during any given month, that child support
will be calculated on the sole-custody support worksheet."

(R.

2056, 2060)
CHILD SUPPORT - ALIMONY
At the time of trial Husband was employed as an independent
contractor at the Spine Center in West Valley City. (R. 2262-2265)
Husband's 1994 Form 1099 reflected income of $123,869.50 before
Husband's business expenses to be claimed on Schedule C.2
17, P18)

The trial court found Husband's annual income to be

$124,600.00
breaking

(Exh. P-

before

down

to

and

$115,000.00

$9,583.00

per

after

month

expenses per month, but before taxes.
Finding of Fact 6)

business

after

$800.00

expenses,
business

(R. 1147, 1638, 2286,

For purposes of Husband's appeal, Husband

accepts the trial court's finding of $9,583.00 before tax income.3
2

Defendant also earned an additional $1,174.44 during 1994
working for the Park City Ski Port. (R. 2286, Exh. P-18)
3

Husband reserves the right to challenge both the Court's
determination of his gross income and his monthly business expenses
7

Wife testified that after Mikell was about one year old, Wife
returned to work part-time and worked about one day per week, that
Husband agreed that Wife should just work part-time and did not
insist that she work full-time.

(R. 1890-93)

Wife was working

about two and one-half days per week when Christopher was born.
She then took maternity leave for a year with Husband's consent.
When Christopher was fourteen months old, Wife returned to work as
a paralegal working two days per week about two to three hours each
day, again with Husband's consent.

(R. 1896-8)

The parties then

separated for two and one-half years and the children lived with
Wife.

During this time Wife worked approximately 20 to 25 hours

per week as a paralegal with a flexible schedule.
until Mikell was in kindergarten in 1991.

This lasted

Wife then reconciled

with Husband in 1991 at which time the parties moved from New
Mexico to Utah. (R. 1882, 1900-01)

Husband agreed that Wife did

not have to work if she did not want to due to Husband's income.
(R. 1903)

Wife went to work for Snow Christensen as a nurse

paralegal in October, 1991 and worked 25 to 30 hour weeks on a
flexible schedule to accommodate Wife's commitment to the children
and because Wife was a "wimp about driving in the snow" from Park
City.

Husband agreed to the arrangement because neither party

wanted the children in full-time day care. (R. 1907-8)

Wife left

Snow Christensen in August, 1994, the same time she filed for
divorce. (R. 1908, 1922)

At that time she was making $23.75 per

hour. (R. 2464)
in order to defend against Wife's cross appeal.
8

Wife went to work as a nurse paralegal at Richards, Brandt,
Miller & Nelson in October, 1994, at $15.00 per hour.
under

the

impression

she

could

work

flexible

Wife was

hours, but

was

terminated on December, 1994, by the firm for leaving work daily at
3:30 p.m. to be home when her children returned home from school
despite the firm's expectations that she work full days. (R. 19671975)
At the time of trial in October, 1995, Wife worked for Kipp
and Christian at $18.50 per hour.

Wife had flexible hours and

could set her own schedule (R. 2212)

As discussed in Point IV, the

trial

court

found that due to past agreements of the parties

regarding Wife's part-time work and needs of the children, Wife's
income would be calculated based upon a 30 hour week at $18.50 per
hour.

Husband herein challenges the trial court's failure to

impute Wife's income based on a 40 hour work week.
The Court found that Husband's monthly expenses

including

child support and taxes, were $8,045.00 and that Wife's monthly
expenses were $4,595.00.4

It found that Wife's net income was

$1,800.00 per month after taxes based upon a 30 hour work week.
Husband was ordered

to pay Wife $1,400.00 per month

in child

support and $1,200.00 in alimony. (R. 1147-8, 1637-1640, Finding of
Fact Number 9)
Husband was ordered to pay the monthly home mortgage payment
of $1,789.00 until the home was either refinanced by Wife or sold
4

Husband does not challenge the trial court's findings of the
parties' reasonable expenses herein, but reserves the right to do
so if necessary to defend against Wife's cross-appeal.
9

with Husband

to receive

a credit

support and alimony obligations.

therefore

against

his

child

Husband was further ordered to

pay the Home Equity Line of Credit payments until the home was
refinanced or sold. (R. 1642, Finding of Fact number 11)
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS AND REAL PROPERTY
Assets

of

the marriage

included Husband's

retirement

and

brokerage accounts in the approximate amount of $277,994.34. (R.
1645), Finding of Fact number 15)
of the value of these accounts.
City,

Utah

and

held

Each party was awarded one-half

The marital home, located in Park

exclusively

in

Husband's

name,

was

by

stipulation valued at $385,000.00 and had a first mortgage balance
of $176,165.00 at time of trial.

Wife was granted possession of

the home pending sale or refinancing. (R. 1641-2, Finding of Fact
number 11)
At time of trial the home was also subject to a Home Equity
Line of Credit in the approximate amount of $25,435.00.

The trial

court awarded the home equity after the first mortgage equally to
the parties and ordered Husband to pay all of" the Home Equity Line
of Credit out of his half of the equity. (R. 1641, Finding of Fact
11)
The trial court found that Husband should pay all of the Home
Equity Line of Credit because the Sea Doos awarded to Husband were
purchased at $12,500.00 therefrom, Husband had paid attorney's fees
to Craig Peterson therefrom, and Husband had paid temporary support
owed to Wife therefrom. (R. 1641, Finding of Fact number 11)

10

PERSONAL PROPERTY
The trial court awarded Husband Sea Doos valued at $7,500.00
at time of trial which were obtained through the Home Equity Line
of Credit for $12,500.00 in August, 1994.
awarded

Husband

household

items

The trial court further

(furniture

etc.)

valued

at

$11,050.00, the 1992 Subaru SVX automobile valued at $2,825.00, the
Zion's checking account with a balance of $250.00, and the Zion's
Money Market account with a balance of $600.00 (all valued at time
of trial). (R. 1644-5, Finding of Fact 14)
The trial court also awarded Husband $75,000.00 in value of an
IRA account which requires separate discussion and is one of the
subjects of appeal herein.

The trial court totalled Husband's
(id.)

value of personal property to be $89,725.00.
The

trial

court

awarded

Wife

household

items

valued

at

$14,636.00, the 1994 Subaru valued at $1,795.00, and the February,
1995 IRA distribution of $1,200.00, with such amounts totalling to
$17,631.00.

After adjusting for $6,450.00 of the $75,000.00 IRA

which went to Wife, the trial court then ordered that the net
$29,597.00 difference in personal property values be paid to Wife
out of Husband's share of the home equity (before considering the
Home Equity Line of Credit) (id.,

R. 1643, Finding of Fact 13)

IRA
When the parties separated in August, 1994, Husband removed
$57,018.26 from Husband's IRA account which valued approximately
$75,000.00.

Of

that

amount

Husband

used

$18,480.00

to

pay

estimated federal tax and $4,480.00 to pay estimated state tax. (R.
11

2317-8, 2440, 2505, Exh. D-28)
Husband

to

withdraw

an

Subsequently, the Court authorized

additional

$12,900.00

with

one-half

($6,450.00) to benefit each of the parties as follows: $6,000.00 to
attorneys' fees ($3,000.00 to each party's attorney), $3,000.00 to
Dr. Elizabeth Stewart for the custody evaluation and $3,900.00 for
payment

of family medical bills.

At the time he removed

$12,900.00, Husband removed the remaining approximate

the

$4,000.00

from the IRA as well, thus closing out the IRA. (R. 1642, Finding
of Fact number 12)
The trial court ordered that Husband pay the ten percent
penalty on all of the $75,000.00 except for $645.00 attributable to
Wife's $6,450.00 benefit therefrom.

The trial court found that

approximately $18,000.00 would be owed in income taxes on the IRA
funds and ordered the parties to share in payment of taxes with
$18,000.00 of the anticipated proceeds of the home being applied to
such taxes before
determined,

the parties' one-half

equity positions

were

(id.)
TAXES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

The trial court also ordered the parties to file joint 1994
income taxes and to equally share in the responsibility for taxes
owed.

(R.

1146,

1361-2,

1642-3)

The

court

made

no

rulings

regarding responsibility for capital gains taxes on the home.

It

ordered Husband to pay $15,000.00 of Wife's attorney's fees and
that

such amount be paid

equity.

from Husband's one-half

(R. 1643-4, Finding of Fact number 13)
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of the home

SUBSEQUENT ORDER
Husband

failed to make the home payments and

proceedings commenced against the marital home.

foreclosure

By order entered

October 14, 1996, the trial court stated that Husband's equity was
$104,417.50 and then re-defined charges upon Husband's equity in
the

home

to

include

foreclosure

costs

and

monthly

mortgage

arrearages, the Home Equity Line of Credit, Husband's attorneys'
liens

(Okasaki

and

Christian),

Wife's

attorney's

lien

of

$15,000.00, and one-half of the State Tax Commission tax warrant.
The order further provided that if the total of the foregoing
encumbrances were in excess of Husband's equity, Husband would
provide to First American Title certified funds to pay the balance
in full. (R. 1778-9, 1109-10, 1307-8).
A handwritten paragraph 8 of the order stated, "It appears to
the Court that the amount Dr. Bova will owe is approx. $4,000, but
that amount may vary depending on exact amount of liens."5 (R.
1780)

An

effect

of

the order was to

leave Wife's

award

of

$29,597.00 intended to equalize the personal property no longer
secured by Husband's equity.

5

Based upon Wife's affidavit (R.1730) it appears that
anticipated foreclosure costs, including the arrearage, penalties
and legal costs, were approximately $16,000.00, the Home Equity
Line of Credit was approximately $3 0,424.40, the Okasaki and
Christian attorneys' fees liens (Husband's) were $38,489.42 and
$4,864.59, Wife's attorney's lien was $15,000 and one-half of the
state tax lien was $2,627.50.
These figures subtracted from
$104,417.50 leave a negative balance of $2,988.41.
13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DOUBLE ASSESSING
HUSBAND FOR SEA DOO DEBT AND HOUSEHOLD ITEMS, AND FOR
ASSESSING HUSBAND FOR IRA FUNDS EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT
OF BOTH PARTIES
The trial court erred in assigning all $12,500.00 in Sea Doo
debt where the value of the Sea Doos at trial was only $7,500.00.
The trial court also erred in double counting household items worth
$4,577.00 in determining the value of personal property awarded to
Husband.

The trial court further erred in assigning

personal

property value to Husband of proceeds of the IRA which prior to
trial had been expended for family purposes such as attorneys'
fees, custody evaluation, medical expenses and income taxes. These
over-assessments total $43,513.00 and result in an over-award to
Wife of $21,756.50.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE EXPENSE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES ON THE
MARITAL HOME AND THEREBY ASSESSING ALL OF SUCH TAXES TO
HUSBAND
The marital home was owned exclusively in Husband's name. The
trial court ordered the equity in the marital home split without
considering

the

effect

of

the

28%

anticipated gain of approximately

capital

gains

$120,000.00.

tax

on

an

Such taxes of

$33,600.00 will be wholly borne by Husband as a result of his
exclusive ownership.

The trial court abused its discretion in not

allocating one-half of the capital gains tax responsibility to
Wife.
14

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING HUSBAND
TO ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HOME EQUITY LINE OF
CREDIT WHERE $11,500,00 OF SUCH DEBT RESULTED FROM THE
TRIAL COURT'S EXCESSIVE TEMPORARY SUPPORT ORDER
Husband, ordered to pay temporary support in the amount of
$3,134.00 monthly and to pay disability insurance in the amount of
$318.00, had insufficient income to pay such amount and borrowed
about $11,500.00 against a home equity line of credit. After trial
Husband's combined child support and alimony was set at $2,600.00
per month,

a difference

difference, plus property

of

$852.00 per month.

taxes paid,

exceeded

This
the

monthly

$11,500.00

borrowed through the home equity line of credit while the case was
pending trial.

The trial court erred in ordering Husband to pay

all $11,500.00 of the home equity line of credit and should have
required Wife to pay one-half.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
IMPUTE FULL TIME WORK INCOME TO WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPUTING CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
The trial court erred in failing to impute child support and
alimony income to Wife based upon a 40 hour work week since Wife's
history of working part-time was a result of adequate incomes for
one household and since Wife has a flexible work schedule and no
responsibility for the children during at least ten weekdays per
month.

The trial court erred in not considering these factors when

it imputed Wife's income on the basis of a 30 hour work week.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING CHILD
SUPPORT BY IMPUTING 100 PERCENT OF INCOME AT THE MAXIMUM
TABLE AMOUNT TO HUSBAND AND ZERO TO WIFE WHERE HUSBAND'S
INCOME DID NOT MEET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT AND WIFE HAD
SUBSTANTIAL INCOME
The parties stipulated that child support would be figured
"according to the schedule."

However, Husband's gross income of

$9,583.00 and Wife's gross income of $2,386.00 based upon a thirty
hour work week totalled to more than $10,000.00, the maximum amount
of the schedule.

The trial court erred in setting Husband's child

support at $1,400.00 per month, which figure assumes that Husband
earned $10,000.00 per month and Wife earned zero.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING THE
TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS TO HUSBAND
The

trial

court

erred

in

not

awarding

Husband

the

tax

dependency exemptions where the court failed to make findings of
fact, failed to consider Husband's high support obligation, failed
to consider Husband's extensive visitation time, failed to consider
Wife's ability to work a 40 hour week and failed to consider the
inadequacy of Husband's property award.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING WIFE
ATTORNEYS FEES WHERE WIFE WAS WITHOUT NEED, HUSBAND WAS
WITHOUT ABILITY TO PAY AND ADEQUATE FINDINGS WERE NOT
ENTERED
The
attorney's

trial
fees

court
where

erred
it

in

awarding

failed

to

Wife

$15,000.00

consider

the

in

gross

disproportionality of the property settlement in favor of Wife,
16

Wife's lack of need for assistance with her fees, and Husband's
lack of ability to pay fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DOUBLE ASSESSING
HUSBAND FOR SEA D00 DEBT AND HOUSEHOLD ITEMS, AND FOR
ASSESSING HUSBAND FOR IRA FUNDS EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT
OF BOTH PARTIES
The
marital

trial

court properly

property and debt.

attempted

to

equally

split

However, the court made

the

numerous

significant errors which must be corrected by this Court.
Sea Doos debt. In Finding of Fact number 11, the trial court
found that approximately $18,000.00 of the Home Equity Line of
Credit was used by Husband for his own purposes to pay attorneys'
fees6 and to purchase Sea Doo water crafts which were awarded to
Husband in Finding of Fact number 14.
Sea Doos cost $12,500.00. (R.

Husband testified that the

1641, 1644-5)

The trial court found

that at the time of trial the Sea Doos were worth $7,500.00 and
awarded them to Husband. (R. 1644-5, Finding of Fact number 14)

In

Finding of Fact 14 the trial court subtracted $7,500.00 from the
value of personal property which it was awarding to Husband because
it had ordered Husband to pay the debt associated with the Sea Doos
in Finding of Fact 11.
The trial court erred in not recognizing that it had ordered
Husband to pay $12,500.00 worth of debt in Finding of Fact number
11 while unequally "offsetting" it with only $7,500.00 worth of

6

This finding is challenged at Point III,
17

supra.

property value in Finding of Fact number 14.

Thus the trial court

left Husband with $5,000.00 in debt not matched by receipt of an
equivalent property value.

Husband is, therefore, entitled to a

credit of $2,500.00 and the trial court erred in not granting such
credit.
Household items awarded to Husband.

In Finding of Fact 14 the

trial court found that after deducting $7,500.00 for the value of
the Sea Doos, Husband would receive $11,050.00 in household items.
The trial court also found that Husband had received $75,000.00 in
value of funds Husband removed from an IRA.7
However, Husband testified that he used a portion of the IRA
proceeds to purchase household items including the boy's bedroom
($3,600.00), kitchen ($850.00), recreation room ($1,200.00), Hi-Fi
($650.00), and dining room ($3,200.00) when he established his new
household following the parties' separation.
2377, 2505-6, Exh. D-28)

(R. 2313-4, 2375-

Further Exhibit D-28 also showed that a

computer and station costing $2,400.00 and $320.00 respectively
were also purchased with IRA money.

These items in turn appeared

on the appraisal used by the trial court in determining the value
of personal property awarded to the parties.8

(Exh. D-25)

The

total appraised value of these item came to $4,577.00.
The

appraisal

valued

the

Sea

Doos

at

$7,500.00

and

all

7

The $75,000 figure itself is erroneous for reasons discussed,

infra.
8

These appear as items 4, 6, 15, 18, 20, 21a, 23, 26, 27, 28,
31, 32, 37, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47 of the appraisal on Exhibit D25.
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property at Husband's home (including the Sea Doos) at $18,770.00
after adjustments. (Exh. D-25)
Husband's

personal

property

Therefore, the Court's valuing of
exclusive

of

the

Sea

Doos

as

$11,050.00, necessarily included the items purchased with the IRA
funds.

The Court erred in double counting the household item

valued at $4,577.00 at time of trial.
IRA value attributable to Husband.

The trial court erred in

crediting Husband with the full value of the $75,000.00 removed
from the IRA.

Early in the proceedings the trial court authorized

Husband to remove $12,100.00 and pay $6,000.00 ($3,000.00 each) for
the parties' attorneys' fees, $3,000.00 for Dr. Stewart's custody
evaluation

and

$3,900.00

for

family medical

bills.

(R. 1642,

Finding of Fact 12)

The trial court ordered that Husband pay all

of the tax penalty

associated

with the $75,000.00

except

the

penalty associated with the $6,450.00 attributable to Wife's onehalf of the $12,900.00 removed with court permission. Husband does
not challenge this specific ruling.
before

income

tax,

Husband

However, it is clear that

received

only

$62,900.00,

not

$75,000.00, since the $12,900.00 had previously been expended with
Court permission to the benefit of both parties.
The trial court found that taxes of $16,000.00 were owed on
the IRA withdrawal exclusive of the penalty to be paid.

It ordered

Wife and Husband to bear the costs of income taxes equally by
ordering that the $16,000.00 in taxes be paid from the proceeds of
the home before proceeds were divided between the parties,

{id.)

Additionally, the trial court intended that each party bear one19

half of all of the 1994 income taxes, except the IRA penalty. (R.
1362)
Husband's

$62,900.00

share of the

IRA

is reduced by

the

$8,000.00 he must pay for taxes on the $75,000.00. Husband's share
is enhanced to the extent that Wife pays taxes on the $75,000.00 in
excess of the $6,450.00 she received as one-half of the $12,900.00
withdrawn with court permission.

Wife's

$6,450.00 equals

8.6

percent of the total $75,000.00. This 8.6 percent times $16,000.00
total tax liability equals $1,376.00.

Thus Husband benefits by

Wife paying $8,000.00 in taxes on the $75,000.00 in the amount of
$6,624.00.

[$,8,000.00-$l,376.00]

Husband's

property attributable to the IRA after taxes
penalty)

therefore

is

$61,524.00

net

receipt

of

(exclusive of the

($62,900.00-$l,376.00) .

Accordingly, the Court erred in ignoring prior expenditures and tax
consequences in valuing Husband's IRA value at $75,000.00 rather
than $61,524.00.
Further, Husband testified that he withdrew $57,018.26 from
the IRA on August 18, 1994. He testified he used $18,480.00 of the
IRA funds to pay partial estimated 1994 federal income tax, and
$4,480.00 to pay partial estimated 1994 state income tax, such
disbursements totalling $22,960.00.9 (R. 2317-8, 2440, 2505, Exh.
D-28, Exh. P-23, p.10)
the withdrawal

Wife challenged Husband's wisdom in making

(R. 2390-1, Exh. P-23), but not the

Husband had made the $22,960.00 in tax payments.
9

fact

that

Therefore, these

Husband also used $5, 600 to pay estimated penalty tax on the
withdrawal. As previously noted, Husband was required to pay all
of the penalty associated with this amount.
20

facts must also be taken into account in determining the amount of
the IRA actually received by Husband.

As the trial court ruled

that $16,000.00 of taxes attributed to the IRA withdrawal would be
paid from proceeds from the sale of the home and intended that each
party pay one-half of the 1994 income taxes (R. 1362), Husband's
estimated tax payments of $22,960.00 made in August, 1994 applied
towards the parties' taxes from employment income and benefitted
both parties.

Exhibit D-19, the joint 1994 1040 tax return which

Husband prepared, showed at line 55 that $44,640.00 of estimated
taxes had been paid and at line 64 that $25,422.00 remained to be
paid.

This $25,422.00 amount corresponds with the

$18,000.00

income taxes and the $7,500.00 penalty the Court estimated to be
owed on the IRA withdrawal.

Therefore, the $22,960.00 expended by

Husband for the common benefit of the parties was not available and
was not received by Husband as his portion of the personal property
settlement.

The Court erred in including this $22,960 value in

Plaintiff's personal property received.
This case is controlled by Enrody

v.

Enrody,

914 P.2d 1166,

1170-1 (Utah App. 1996), the wife argued that the trial court erred
in

failing

to

require

the

husband

to

transferred while the divorce was pending.

account

for

property

This Court upheld the

trial court noting that $20,000.00 of cattle had been sold by
Husband to pay for temporary support and that a home transferred
into a trust had been accounted for by awarding the wife one-half
of

husband's

ownership

in

the

trust.

Therefore,

it

was

inappropriate to charge the husband for non-existent or duplicated
21

assets.
To

summarize, the

$89,725.00

value

assessed

as

Husband's

personal property in Finding of Fact number 14, must be reduced as
follows:
$ 2,500.00

1/2 of $5,000.00 debt not shared
by Wife (Sea Doos $12,500.00
loan - $7,500.00 value at trial)

$ 4,577.00

Double counted Household Items

$12,100.00

Used to pay authorized
expenses equally for both
parties

$ 1,376.00

Wife's portion of $16,000.00
taxes ($8,000.00-$6,62 7.00)

$22,960.00

Spent in 1994 to pay 1994
income taxes

Total adjustment:
The

trial

$43,513.00

court

clearly

erred

in

failing

to make

adjustments and as a result improperly awarded Wife
[$43,513.00/2].
$21,756.00

these

$21,756.00

The court's $29,597.00 figure must be reduced by

to $7,840.50 before

further adjustment

is made

capital gains tax liabilities considered in Point II.

for

The case

must be remanded with instructions to correct these errors.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE EXPENSE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES ON THE
MARITAL HOME AND THEREBY ASSESSING ALL OF SUCH TAXES TO
HUSBAND
The trial court intended that the equity in the home be shared
equally by the parties.10 (R. 1643-4), Finding of Fact Number 13)
10

Wife testified that Husband should receive one-half of the
equity in the home, but with such one-half to be charged with her
22

Despite good intentions, the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding Wife one-half of the equity without also requiring her to
be responsible for one-half of the capital gains taxes attributable
thereto.
Title to the marital home was in Husband's name alone and
Husband was solely liable on the first mortgage and the home equity
line of credit.11

(R. 2497)

The first mortgage balance as of

October 1, 1995 was $176,165.00. (R. 2498)

Pursuant to stipulated

appraisal, the trial court found the value of the home at time of
trial in October, 1995, to be $385,000.00. (R. 1641, Finding of
Fact number 11)
During the pendency of the action and afterwards under the
Decree of Divorce, Wife was granted the exclusive possession of the
home.

Husband has not lived in the home since August, 1994.

The

trial court ordered that either the home be refinanced in Wife's
name with Wife to have title, or that the home be sold with each
party to receive one-half
payment

of the equity after costs of sale,

of the first mortgage and payment of the 1994

income

taxes.12 (R. 1641-3, Finding of Fact numbers 11, 13) Husband's onehalf of the home equity, in turn, was to be charged for payment of

share of the IRA proceeds received by Husband.

(R. 2179-80)

l:L

Husband testified that the home, mortgage and home equity
line of credit were in his name alone due to Wife's poor credit
history.
(R. 2497-9)
12

As of the date of this brief the home had not been sold and
Wife had not qualified to refinance the home. Given the passage of
time to date without refinancing and Wife's poor credit history
(R.2497-9) it is highly unlikely that Wife will refinance the home.
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Wife's

$29,597.00

balance

due

to

equalize

personal

property

distribution,13 $15,000.00 of Wife's attorney's fees, and all of the
$7,500.00 IRA withdrawal penalty except only $645.00 attributable
to the $6,450.00 benefit received by Wife of Husband's authorized
$12,900.00 withdrawal.14 (R. 1643, Finding of Fact number 13)
By not considering taxes, the trial court further dramatically
lessened Husband's share of the property settlement.
basis is $265,000.00.

The home's

Husband, as sole owner, will be 100 percent

assessed by the IRS for capital gains taxes on the $120,000.00 gain
if the property is sold.

Husband thus stands to pay $33,600.00 in

capital gains taxes incurred at the top rate of 2 8 percent given
Husband's level of income.

26 U.S.C. § 1(h)

The decree completely

fails to allocate any responsibility for payment of such taxes to
Wife.
Further, Husband will not be eligible to roll over any portion
of the gain into the purchase of a new principal residence within
two years.

Section 1034 of 26 U.S.C. authorizes the roll-over of

up to $125,000.00 of gain into another principal residence acquired
within two years provided the home sold was the seller's principal
residence.

Husband

does

not

meet

the

"principal

residence"

condition since he hasn't lived in the home since 1994. Therefore,
an immediate tax liability awaits Husband on the sale of the home.
13

As shown in Point I, the $29,597 figure is itself incorrect,
and should be $7,840.50 before considering capital gains tax issues
raised in Point II.
14

A year later this arrangement was adjusted to deal with liens
filed by Husband's attorneys and other issues.
(R. 1778-80) See
discussion at pages 13-14, supra.
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Howell

This case is completely different from the situation in
v. Howell,

806

P.2d

1209, 1213-4

(Utah App.

1991) where

tax

consequences were properly disregarded as speculative because tax
liability might be avoided through use of the Section 1034 roll
over.15
The case must be remanded with the trial court ordered to
consider the impact of taxes upon its allocations of marital assets
and debts and to require the parties to equally bear the tax
responsibility of sale of the home.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING HUSBAND
TO ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HOME EQUITY LINE OF
CREDIT WHERE SUCH $11,500.00 OF SUCH DEBT RESULTED FROM
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCESSIVE TEMPORARY SUPPORT ORDER
Husband purchased the Sea Doos for $12,500.00 in August or
September,

1993

through

a Home

Equity

Line

of

Credit

(HELC)

established pursuant to an loan application filed in April, 1993.
(Exh. D-23, R. 2174-5, 2543).

Wife testified that about the same

time as Husband purchased the Sea Doos in 1993 Husband accessed the
line of credit for an additional $3,000.00 (R. 2176, 2179) which he
used

to

pay

$3,200.00

in

attorney's

fees

to

attorney

Craig

Peterson.16
15

Also, in Howell the facts indicated that the home was owed
by both parties thus leaving both parties with a stake in assuring
that taxes were minimized. 806 P.2d at 1210 Here Wife, free of
tax liability since she doesn't own the home, has no interest in
assuring that Husband's taxes are minimized.
16

Wife did not produce line of credit records and her testimony
was confusing in some regards. Further her testimony was subject
to a continuing objection of lack of foundation and failure to meet
the best evidence rule. Husband believes that this is an accurate
25

Husband testified that he had used the line of credit to
purchase the Sea Doos for $12,500.00 and to pay $3,000.00 to Craig
Peterson

in

approximately

August,

1993.

(R.

2543)

Husband

testified that between August, 1993 and August, 1994 when the
parties separated, the loan balance was paid down to $14,000.00.
(R. 2501, 2543-4)

This testimony was uncontroverted.

In July, 1995, Husband obtained leave of the Court to increase
the line of credit to $20,000.00 to pay mortgage payments owed on
the

home.

Approximately

$3,815.00

was

borrowed

to pay

home

mortgage payments, $1,400.00 was borrowed to pay home property
taxes, a condition of the loan, and an amount not recalled at trial
went to loan fees. (R. 2501-2, 2542-3, 2557)
In October, 1995, Husband again obtained leave to further
increase the line of credit to cover approximately three months
mortgage payments. (R. 2543)

Husband testified that as of the date

of trial the balance of the HELC was $25,435.00. (R. 2498)
In its original minute entry following trial the trial court
stated:
The Court will allow the Home Equity Line of Credit
to be used to pay Dr. Stewart, Family Affairs, and to
bring the mortgage payments current to the date of this
order. The Court will then allow the HELC to be deducted
from the sale proceeds of the home before a division of
the equity with the exception of $18,000. Approximately
that amount was used by defendant for his own purposes
such as attorneys
fees,
the Sea Doos for which he should
be responsible, particularly in light of the fact that
the court is awarding the full value of the Sea Doos to
Defendant without being charged against him as marital
property as set out below. (emphasis added)
representation of Wife's
arguments at R. 2576.

testimony
26

based

upon

Wife's

closing

(R. 1146)
The Court's use of the $18,000.00 figure with reference to
Husband's payment of attorneys' fees is confusing and erroneous.
The evidence was uncontroverted that the line of credit balance was
$14,000.00 when the parties separated and that the Sea Doos were
purchased

for $12,500.00 and $3,000.00 had been paid to Craig

Peterson as attorney's fees in August, 1993, a year before the
parties' separation.

Therefore, even if the Peterson attorney's

fees were wholly assessed to Husband, the unpaid amount at the date
of separation was only $1,500.00 ($14,000.00-$12,500.00=$1,500.00)
and such amount was included within the $14,000.00 balance.
The trial court did arrive at approximately an $18,000.00
figure when, during Husband's testimony, it reviewed the figures
before it and cited the $12,500.00 Sea Doo amount, approximately
$4,000.00

($3,815.00)

property taxes.

in

mortgage

payments

and

$1,400.00

in

The Court noted that these amounts approximated

$18,000.00, and that $7,000.00 represented the approximate balance
of the line of credit to reach $25,435.00. (R. 2500-2)

The Court

correctly did not include the Peterson attorney's fees in its
review of the evidence at that point.

Presumably, the trial court

confused the evidence when it issued its memorandum decision, but
it erred in using the $18,000.00 figure rather than the $14,000.00
figure as the base figure.17
17

Husband could appropriately challenge the remaining $1,500
difference between $12,500 and $14,000 since the Peterson
attorney's fees were paid a year before the parties separated.
However, Husband waives any claim to the $1,500 for simplicity's
sake, while reserving the right to raise the issue to contest
27

After the trial court's original minute entry, Wife argued
that the balance of the HELC above $18,000.00 consisted of loans
used by Husband

to pay his temporary

support

obligation

and,

therefore, Husband must pay the entire balance of the HELC or Wife
would in effect be paying one-half of Husband's temporary support
obligation. (R. 1168-9)

The trial court agreed with Wife and in

its subsequent minute entry stated:
... The court agrees with Plaintiff that this may
have been error inasmuch as a substantial portion of that
amount of the line of credit that exceeds $18,000.00 was
incurred by the defendant to make mortgage payments and
temporary alimony payments as ordered by the court. To
allow those amount (sic) to be deducted from the sales
proceeds of the home prior to the division of equity
would have the effect of requiring the plaintiff to pay
one half of the temporary alimony and support awarded to
her. This, of course, would be unfair. ... Accordingly,
the court will require the defendant to pay the entire
balance of the home equity line of credit. (R. 1361)
The

trial

court

erred

in requiring Husband

to bear

responsibility for the line of credit above $14,000.00.

full

First, it

is uncontroverted that $1,400.00 of the line of credit went to pay
property taxes on the home and benefitted both parties.
erred in not requiring Wife to pay one-half

The court

($700.00) of such

amount.
Second, the court erred in requiring Husband to assume the
entire $10,035.00 difference between the $15,400.00 balance of the
line of credit after payment of the taxes18 and the $25,435.00
balance of the line of credit at time of trial.

Wife's cross appeal if necessary.
18

$14,000 + $1,4 00 = $15,400
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A spouse with

income sufficient to pay his temporary support obligation perhaps
should not be allowed to escape such obligation by reducing the
value of a marital asset (i.e. home) by encumbering the asset with
loans used to pay for such temporary support.

However, a spouse

who, prior to a full trial on the merits, is required to pay
temporary support beyond his ability, in an amount which exceeds
the amount of support ultimately determined following trial on the
merits, must be credited back the value of his temporary support
over-assessment.
This situation is again governed by Enrody
In Enrody,

1166, 1170-1 (Utah App. 1996).
trial

v. Enrody,

914 P. 2d

this Court upheld the

court's failure to assess the husband

for the value of

$2 0,000.00 of cattle sold by Husband to pay for temporary support.
The husband, due to age and health, was no longer employed as a
highly

paid

pilot

and

did not

have

income

sufficient

to pay

temporary support to wife.
Herein, pursuant to stipulation on August 22, 1994, Husband
was ordered to pay $1,345.00 temporary child support and to pay the
mortgage payment in the amount of $1,789.00 per month as temporary
alimony making a total temporary support obligation of $3,134.00.
(R. 123, 131-2)

After trial on the merits in October, 1995, the

court determined that Husband was able to pay only $1,400.00 in
child support and $1,200.00 in alimony, making a total monthly
obligation of $2,600.00, an amount $534.00 per month less than the
amount of temporary support ordered. (R. 1147-1148)

Additionally,

during the temporary support time period Husband was also ordered
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to maintain disability insurance at the rate of $318.00 per month,
an obligation not required in the final decree. (R. 70, 137, 16401)

Fifteen months

(August, 1994

to October,

1995)

of over-

assessment of $852.00 ($534.00+$318.00) comes to $12,780.00.
additional

months

of

paying

temporary

support

and

Two

disability

insurance between trial date and the court's initial minute entry
ruling

of

December

14,

1995,

which

set

obligation, comes to an additional $1,704.00.

Husband's

permanent

The total of these

two figures ($14,484.00) exceeds the $10,035.00 difference between
the $25,435.00 line of credit balance at trial and the $15,400.00
amount consisting of the $14,000.00 balance at separation plus
payment of $1,400.00 in property taxes on the home.19

Therefore,

Husband's use of the line of credit was reasonable and necessary
and matched his inability to meet his monthly temporary support
obligation.
Accordingly, Husband cannot fairly be required to pay all of
the HELC.

The burden of the HELC must be equally shared between

the parties and the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
Husband to pay excessive temporary support without crediting such
excess back through the property-debt settlement.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
IMPUTE FULL-TIME WORK INCOME TO WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPUTING CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
In Finding of Fact number 6, the Court stated:

19

Loan fees represent some portion of the difference. However,
no testimony was given as to the exact amount of the loan fees.
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The Court finds that during the course of the
marriage, the Plaintiff has always worked part-time since
the birth of the children. Her part-time work schedule
was discussed by the parties and agreed upon by both
parties.
In addition the Court finds, based upon the
testimony of Dr. Stewart, that it is beneficial to the
children's welfare that the Plaintiff not work full-time
so that she can be available to the children when they
come home from school. The Court further believes, that
based upon the finances of the parties that the parties
can afford the arrangement.
(R. 1637-8)
The following facts support, or partially support, the Court's
finding:

The parties have two sons, Mikell Anthony Bova, born

March 8, 1984, and Christopher Melle Bova, born May 17, 1987. (R.
1882)
Wife testified that after Mikell was about one year old, Wife
returned to work part-time and worked about one day per week, that
Husband agreed that Wife should just work part-time and did not
insist that she work full-time.

(R. 1890-93)

Wife was working

about two and one-half days per week when Christopher was born.
She then took maternity leave for a year with Husband's consent.
When Christopher was fourteen months old, Wife returned to work as
a paralegal working two days per week about two to three hours each
day, again with Husband's consent. (R. 1896-8)

The parties then

separated for two and one-half years and the children lived with
Wife.

During this time Wife worked approximately 20 to 25 hours

per week as a paralegal with a flexible schedule.
until Mikell was in kindergarten in 1991.

This lasted

Wife then reconciled

with Husband in 1991 at which time the parties moved from New
Mexico to Utah. (R. 1882, 1900-01)
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Husband agreed that Wife did

not have to work if she did not want to due to Husband's income.
(R. 1903)

Wife went to work for Snow Christensen as a nurse

paralegal in October, 1991 and worked 25 to 30 hour weeks on a
flexible schedule to accommodate Wife's commitment to the children
and because Wife was a "wimp about driving in the snow" from Park
City.

Husband agreed to the arrangement because neither party

wanted the children in full-time day care. (R. 1907-8)

Wife left

Snow Christensen in August, 1994, the same time she filed for
divorce. (R. 1908, 1922)

At that time she was making $23.75 per

hour. (R. 2464)
Wife went to work as a nurse paralegal at Richards, Brandt,
Miller & Nelson in October, 1994, at $15.00 per hour.
under

the

impression

she

could

work

flexible

Wife was

hours, but

was

terminated on December, 1994, by the firm for leaving work daily at
3:30 p.m. to be home when her children returned home from school
despite the firm's expectations that she work full days. (R. 19671975)
At the time of trial in October, 1995, Wife worked for Kipp
and Christian at $18.50 per hour.

Wife had flexible hours and

could set her own schedule. (R. 2212)

Wife testified:

Q
You understand that you can work ten hours a day two
days a week or five hours for four days or four hours for five days
or anything like that?
A

Sounds flexible.

Q
You understand that to be the case, that you have an
absolutely flexible schedule?
A

Yes.

Q

And you can basically set your own schedule?
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A

I can.

(R. 2122)
Later Wife testified that though she enjoyed flexibility Mr.
Christian preferred that she keep a regular schedule. (R. 2470)
Wife acknowledged that the parties had used a full-time nanny
when she worked at Snow Christensen and that before both children
were in school she used day care providers. (R. 2470)
Contrary to the Court's finding, Dr. Stewart never testified
that Wife needed to be with the children after school.20
Stewart

did

at page

3 of her Recommendations

in her

Dr.

custody

evaluation state:
D. Ability to Provide Personal Rather than Surrogate
Care.
Both parents could adjust their schedules to
provide personal care after school hours rather than
having to work until five or six in the evening. It is
essential for these boys to have someone at home when
they return from school because they are at an age when
they want to talk about problems or other matters
concerning their lives. These boys should not be left on
their own during after school hours because of their need
for someone to be available to them.
This is more
important for these children than it is for children who
are not in a similar situation. (emphasis added.)
(R. 451)
The trial court abused its discretion in not imputing fulltime income to Wife.

First, the Court failed to distinguish that

the initial agreements by Husband that Wife work only part-time
clearly

related

to years where

the children were very young.

Second, after the parties moved to Utah, Husband had agreed that
Wife

need

only

work

part-time

20

because

the

parties,

residing

Husband has diligently searched Dr. Stewart's testimony,
including using "school" in a word search of the transcript floppy
disk. Husband has been unable to find any such testimony.
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together as a unit, could afford the luxury.

Husband's consent to

part-time work clearly was not based upon an assumption of the
parties having two households.
Third, and most significant, the court's finding completely
ignored the visitation schedule as it relates to Wife's testimony
that

she

could

work

very

flexible

hours.

Dr.

Stewart's

recommendation recognized that both parents had flexible schedules
which could and should be adjusted to meet the children's needs.
Dr. Stewart did not recommend that either parent limit employment
hours, but did strongly urge that employment hours be adjusted.
Husband has the children after school from Wednesday until
before school on Monday at least once a month and after school on
Thursday until before school on Monday at least once per month.
During

the summer Husband has the children

from 1:00

p.m.

on

alternating Wednesdays or Thursdays. (R. 1636, Finding of Fact 5)
This provides Wife with at least ten week days every month where
she may work full-time or longer days.21

It also provides her with

at least four weekend days each month when she may work to make up
the average five hours per week missed in meeting the children
after school on Mondays, Tuesdays and sometimes on Wednesdays.

The

trial court erred in failing to consider these facts.
Despite granting Husband at least ten "after school days" each
month, the trial court did not reduce Husband's anticipated income.
Neither should it have done so for Wife.

21

Section 78-45-4(1), Utah

Wife also has a full month during the summer to work
uninterrupted when the children are with Husband.
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Code Annotated provides, "Every woman shall support her child ..."
Sections 78-45-7.5(6) and (7), Utah Code Annotated, provide that
income will be imputed where a parent is under-employed.

This

Court has also imputed income for purposes of determining alimony
as well as child support.
App.

1994),

1996) ("Willey
App.

Willey

v.

v. Hill,

Willey,

IX"), Willey

1993) ("Willey

Hill

v.

I"), Hall

869 P.2d 963, 965-6, (Utah

914 P.2d
Willey,
v.

1149, 1152

(Utah App.

866 P.2d 547, 553-554 (Utah

Hall,

858 P.2d 1018, 1023-1026

(Utah App. 1993).
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider
the time-frames and circumstances of Husband's agreements that Wife
work only part-time and Wife's ability to work full-time week days
when the children are with Husband and to work weekends when the
children are with Husband.
This Court should remand with instructions for the trial court
to consider these issues and enter new findings reflecting the
amount of child support and alimony.

If income is not imputed for

Wife it must be reduced for Husband to reflect his need to meet the
children after school at least ten days each month.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING CHILD
SUPPORT BY IMPUTING 100 PERCENT OF INCOME AT THE MAXIMUM
TABLE AMOUNT TO HUSBAND AND ZERO TO WIFE WHERE HUSBAND'S
INCOME DID NOT MEET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT AND WIFE HAD
SUBSTANTIAL INCOME
Wife

is a registered nurse who was employed by Kipp and

Christian as a nurse paralegal approximately 25 to 30 hours per
week at the rate of $18.50 per hour.
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(R. 1638)

Husband has a

medical degree with board certification in emergency medicine and
sports medicine.

At the time of trial Husband was employed as an

independent contractor at the Spine Center in West Valley City. (R.
2262-2265)

Husband's

1994

Form

1099

reflected

income

of

$123,869.50 before Husband's business expenses to be claimed on
Schedule C.22

(Exh. P-17, P18)

annual

to be

income

The trial court found Husband's

$124,600.00

before

and

$115,000.00

after

business expenses, breaking down to $9,583.00 per month

after

$800.00 business expenses per month, but before taxes. (R. 1147,
1638, 2286, Finding of Fact 6)

For purposes of Husband's appeal,

Husband accepts these findings by the trial court.23
Husband

challenges

the

manner

in

which

the

trial

court

determined Husband's $1,400.00 per month child support obligation.
After a hard fought custody battle, the parties stipulated to a
custody/visitation arrangement whereby Wife received custody of the
two children but Husband, inter

alia,

would have the children from

Wednesday evening to Monday morning on one alternating week and
from Thursday evening to Monday morning on the next alternating
week.

This arrangement plus holidays resulted in Husband having

possession of the children over thirty-three percent of the time.24
22

Def endant also earned an additional $1,174 . 44 during 1994
working for the Park City Ski Port. (R. 2286, Exh. P-18)
23

Husband reserves the right to challenge both the Court's
determination of his gross income and his monthly business expenses
in order to defend against Wife's cross appeal.
24

Without counting holidays, Husband has the children three
days per week for 2 6 weeks (78 days) , a fourth day each other
alternating week for 13 weeks (13 days) and four weeks each summer
(28 days). These total to 119 days before considering
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As part of the custody/visitation stipulation it was "also
agreed that, irrespective of the amount of time that the defendant
has with the children during any given month, that child support
will be calculated on the sole-custody support worksheet."

(R.

2056, 2060)
The trial court's memorandum decision and the parties' written
memoranda which followed revealed that the Court, Wife and Husband
each

had

a

stipulation.

different
The

trial

construction
court's

of

the

memorandum

meaning
decision

of

the

assessed

Husband's child support obligation at $1,400.00 per month which
corresponds to the table's $1,400.00 amount for the $10,000.00
maximum assuming Husband earned $10,000.00 and Wife earned nothing.
(R. 1638)

Wife, assuming Husband's gross income to be $9,583.00,

argued that the stipulation meant that the Court would extrapolate
beyond the schedule and argued that Husband should be assessed
$1,944.00.

(R.

1172-1174,

1178)

Husband

argued

that

the

stipulation meant that each party would pay her/his respective
proportional share of the maximum $1,400.00, and that his pro-rata
share

was

$8,783.00.

$1,106.00

based

upon

(R. 1244-5, 1280)

his

assumed

gross

income

of

The trial stayed with its ruling

that Husband was to pay $1,400.00 per month without explaining how
it arrived at its figure. (R. 1638-9, Finding of Fact 7)
The trial court erred in not applying the stipulation of the
parties according to its language.

By the express terms of the

stipulation the trial court was obligated to calculate the amount
holiday visitation.
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of support "on the sole custody worksheet." As the trial court and
parties were aware when the stipulation was entered, the worksheet
only accepts combined incomes to $10,000.00.
court

was

obligated

to assess

Father's

Therefore, the trial

support

obligation

by

reference to his pro rata portion of the parties' combined incomes
as applied to the $1,400.00 maximum table amount.
support

level

earnings

of

therefore
$11,969.00

comes

to

[$9,583.00

$1,12 0.00
+

Father's proper

based

$2,386.00

=

a

combined

$11,969.00]

[$9, 583.00/$ll,969.00 = 80%] 25 [8 0%*$1,4 00.00=$1,12 0.00] Accordingly,
this Court should remand with instructions to enter support in such
amount or lower if it finds that additional

income

should be

imputed to Wife as argued below.
Alternatively, the trial court erred in extrapolating beyond
the

table

while

failing

to

make

specific

findings

on

"all

appropriate and just" factors required by Section 78-45-7.12, Utah
Code Annotated, to allow this Court to determine whether it abused
its discretion.

In Ball

v.

Peterson,

912 P. 2d 1006, 1014

(Utah

App. 1996), the Court stated,
We agree with Mr. Peterson that in cases such as
his, where the parties' income exceeds the highest
monthly combined adjusted gross income listed on the
statutory table, linear extrapolation of the child
support obligation table alone is not enough.
Strict
reliance on linear extrapolation would be erroneous,
because taken to the extreme, a child could be awarded
support vastly exceeding any reasonable need. Rather, a
trial judge must consider and make specific findings on
all "appropriate and just" factors.
We conclude the
trial court's findings are insufficient for us to
determine whether the court exceeded the limits of its
25

Husband's percentage may be less than 80% if Wife's
additional ability to earn is imputed per Point IV.
38

discretion.
Accordingly, we remand for proper child
support findings and an award consistent with those
findings.
Particularly where Defendant has the children over thirty-four
percent of the time, it would be an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to have engaged

in any extrapolation.

The trial

court's failure to explain its ruling requires that the case be
remanded with the trial court required to enter clear and adequate
findings which may be reviewed by this Court.
Finally, the trial court may have felt bound by Section 78-457.12, Utah Code Annotated, to assess the entire $1,400.00 against
Father even though Father does not make $10,000.00 and Wife earns
$2,405.00 per month.

Section 78-45-7.12 states:

If the combined adjust gross income exceeds the
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate and
just child support shall be ordered on a case-by-case
basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the
highest level specified in the table for the number of
children due support.
Only the trial court can say whether its ruling was based on this
statute, but if it were so, Father must be allowed to challenge
this

construction

constitutionality

of
of

the
the

statute
statute

and/or
on

due

to

challenge

process

and

the
equal

protection grounds, since it is patently wrong for the statute to
require that he pay child support on the assumption that he earns
$10,000.00 and Wife earns zero where the facts are wholly contrary.
Rather than start a constitutional battle at this stage without
knowing the trial court's rationale for its ruling, this Court
should remand the case to allow the trial court to clarify its
findings and to allow the parties to respond thereto.
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However, if

this Court were to be inclined to rely upon Section 7.45-7.12 to
uphold the trial court's ruling, Father should be allowed to fully
brief the Court on how he has been denied due process and equal
protection by the statute.26
The

trial

court's

failure

to

enter

specific

findings

explaining the basis of its ruling requires that this Court remand
for the entry of such specific findings.
v.

Breinholt,

Ball,

supra.,

Breinholt

905 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah App. 1995).
POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING THE
TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS TO HUSBAND
The trial court awarded Wife the right to claim the children
on her taxes as dependency exemptions, granting Husband the right
to purchase such exemptions. (R. 1646, Finding of Fact number 17)
Husband

claims error based upon the court's

failure

to

enter

specific findings and to consider Husband's high child support
obligation, the extensive visitation time Husband was granted with
the

children, Wife's

ability

to work

40 hours per week,

and

Husband's inadequate property award.
This Court in Allred

v. Allred,

835 P. 2d 974, 977-8 (Utah App.

1992), thoroughly discussed the law of awarding tax dependency
exemptions:
To consider whether the court properly awarded the
exemption, we rely on Motes v. Motes,
786 P. 2d 232 (Utah
App. 1989). To permit appropriate appellate review of a

26

Husband' s constitutional rights are violated by a statute
which creates an irrebuttable presumption not grounded in reality
and which, in violation of equal protection, assesses husbands with
wives with no income less than husbands with wives who have income.
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trial court's application of the law, the trial court
must have made adequate factual findings.
Walters
v.
Walters,
812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991) . The "findings
'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'
11
Marchant
v. Marchant,
743 P. 2d 199, 2 02-03 (Utah
App.1987) (quoting Acton v. Deliran,
737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987)).
"Indeed, it would be an abuse of
discretion for a divorce court to order a custodial
parent to sign the [tax-exemption waiver] in the absence
of appropriately supported findings to that effect."
Motes,
786 P.2d at 239.

The Federal Tax Code presumes the custodial parent
should receive the dependency exemption. 26 U.S.C. Sec.
152(e) (1988).
The custodial parent may waive the
exemption by signing "a written declaration . . . that such
custodial parent will not claim such child as a
dependent." 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e)(2)(A). Utah courts
have recognized that in some cases it may be in the best
interest of the child for the custodial parent to waive
the tax exemption in favor of the noncustodial parent.
Motes,
786 P. 2d at 239. In such cases, the court may
order the custodial parent to sign a declaration of
waiver consistent with Section 152 of the Tax Code. Id.
Motes recognizes the presumption created by federal
tax law that the custodial parent receive the exemption
and outlines those circumstances where the presumption
can be rebutted:
use of the power to order a custodial parent
to execute a section 152 declaration should
not be used to evenly or otherwise divide the
available exemptions without regard to the
particular
economic
realities.
On the
contrary, it should be limited to those
situations where the non-custodial parent has
the higher income and provides the majority of
support for the child or children whose
exemption is claimed--support at a level which
can be increased as a result of a reduction in
his or her tax burdens. Indeed, it would be
an abuse of discretion for a divorce court to
order
a
custodial
parent
to
sign
the
declaration in the absence of appropriately
supported
findings
to
that
effect
or
demonstrating other exceptional circumstances
making it in the best interest of the parties
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and their children that the declarations be
signed.
Id.
In short, the requirements are twofold. First,
the noncustodial parent must have a higher income and
provide the majority of support for the child. Second,
the trial court must, from its findings, determine that
by transferring
the dependency exemption to the
noncustodial parent, it is not only in the best interest
of the parties, but, more importantly, also in the best
interest of the child, which in all but exceptional
circumstances would translate into an increased support
level for the child.
The trial court must specify in its findings the
reasons the exemption is given to the noncustodial
parent, in accordance with Motes.
From the findings, it is apparent the trial court
did not consider either of these requirements. (FN1) By
failing to apply both Motes requirements, the court erred
as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the award of
the exemption to Husband and remand for an award
consistent with the standards outlined in Motes.
Here

it is clear that Husband has the higher

provides a majority of support for the children.

income

and

Further, it is in

the best interests of the children that the exemption go to Husband
for the following exceptional reasons:
First, Husband has been ordered to pay $1,400.00 per month
support, even though his income does not exceed the maximum amount
of the child support table and even though such amount allocates no
income to Wife.
Second, Husband has the children for extended periods of
visitation beyond the regular visitation guidelines, from Wednesday
or Thursday evenings to Monday mornings every other week.

Such

extended visitation results in added support expenses for Husband
such as food and entertainment beyond that associated with regular
visitation.
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Third, the trial court failed to impute income to Wife for
time she has available to work when the children are with Husband,
thus leaving Wife with less need for the exemption.
Fourth, the trial court failed to consider its inequitable
distribution of property and its effect upon Husband's need for the
exemptions.
Finally, the trial court failed to enter specific findings
explaining its failure to award the exemptions to Husband.
Breinholt

v.

Breinholt,

Motes,

905 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah App. 1995)

This Court must award Husband the exemptions or remand with
instructions for the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light
of the above factors.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING WIFE
ATTORNEYS FEES WHERE WIFE WAS WITHOUT NEED, HUSBAND WAS
WITHOUT ABILITY TO PAY AND ADEQUATE FINDINGS WERE NOT
ENTERED
The trial court ordered that Husband pay $15,000.00 for Wife's
attorney's fees out of Husband's one-half equity in the marital
home. (Exh. P-10, R. 1643-4, 2194, 2450-1, Finding of Fact number
13, R. 1647, Finding of Fact number 19)

The court's original

minute entry stated,
The court finds defendant has far greater ability to
earn income than plaintiff, that he had the ability to
pay attorneys fees and that plaintiff has a need for fees
and awards plaintiff $15,000.00 in fees.
(R. 114 9)

Finding of Fact number 19, ultimately signed by the

trial court was greatly expanded to state:
The Court finds that the income of the Defendant is
far in excess of that income earned by Plaintiff. The
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Court finds that the Defendant had, throughout the course
of these divorce proceedings, adequate funds from his
monthly salary to pay his attorney's fees and that in
addition, he had enough funds to pay for his living
expenses. On the other hand, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff's income per month is approximately one quarter
of that earned by Defendant and that all of the
Plaintiff's monthly income is used to pay for necessary
living expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does
not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees after she
has paid her monthly expenses.
The Court finds that
Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees in this matter
with a balance owing thereon, prior to trial, of
$15,036.00 and that she had incurred additional attorneys
fees and costs for three days of trial; that the
attorney's fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff were
reasonable and necessary in order to represent her; that
the Plaintiff was forced to incur fees in opposing five
motions made by Defendant to lower his child support
and/or alimony obligations which motions were denied each
time by the Court; and that the Plaintiff was forced to
incur attorney's fees and costs in filing motions to
compel to obtain information regarding the Defendant's
financial records. The Court finds that the Plaintiff
has a need for attorney's fees; that the Defendant has a
greater ability to earn income than the Plaintiff; that
the Defendant has the ability to pay for Plaintiff's
attorney's fees; and the Court awards the Plaintiff
$15,000.00 in attorneys fee's.
(R. 1647)
The decision whether to award attorney s rees rests witn the
trial court's sound discretion, Munns v. Munns,

790 P.2d 116, 123

(Utah App. 1990) , but such discretion must be exercised within the
framework of appellate court rulings.

In Haumont v. Haumont,

793

P.2d

this

the

421,

425-6

(Utah

App.

1990)

court

reviewed

requirements for an award of attorney's fees in a divorce action:
To recover attorney fees in a divorce action, the
moving party must show evidence (1) establishing the
financial need of the requesting party, and
(2)
demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount of the
award.
Munns
v. Munns, 790 P. 2d 116, 123 (Utah
Ct .App.1990) ; Asper
v. Asper,
753 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah
Ct.App.1988) ; Porco v. Porco,
752 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah
Ct.App.1988).
In determining the reasonableness of
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claimed attorney fees, this court has stated:
Reasonable attorney fees are not measured by
what an attorney actually bills, nor is the
number
of
hours
spent
on
the
case
determinative
in
computing
fees.
In
determining the reasonableness of attorneys
fees, ... [a] court may consider, among other
factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, the reasonableness of the number of
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar services,
the amount involved in the case and the result
attained, and the expertise and experience of
the attorneys involved.
Rasband
v.
Rasband,
752
P. 2d
1331, 1336
(Utah
Ct.App.1988) (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell,
694 P.2d 622,
624-25 (Utah 1985)); see also Porco,
752 P.2d at 368.
If either financial need or reasonableness has not
been shown, we have reversed awards of attorney fees.
Munns,
790 P. 2d at 123; see Newmeyer v. Newmeyer,
745
P.2d 1276, 1280 (Utah 1987); Asper,
753 P.2d 982.
Furthermore, "[w]here the evidence supporting the
reasonableness of requested attorney fees is both
adequate and entirely undisputed, . . . the court abuses
its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested
unless the reduction is warranted" by one or more of the
above factors. Martindale
v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518
(Utah Ct.App. 1989). The trial court must, accordingly,
identify such factors on the record and also explain its
sua sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful review
on appeal. Id.
Husband's ability to pay must also be considered.
Marshall,

In Marshall

v.

915 P.2d 508, 516-7 (Utah App. 1996) the Court stated:

...The trial court has the authority to award attorney
fees in a divorce action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-3 (1995).
However, the decision to make such an
award " 'must be based on evidence of the financial need
of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees./ff
Willey
v. Willey,
866 P.2d 547, 555 (Utah App.1993)
(quoting Bell
v.
Bell,
810 P.2d 489, 493
(Utah
App.1991)).
The failure to consider any of the
enumerated factors is ground for reversal on the fee
issue. See id. at 556; Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77
(Utah App.1991).
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The court's finding that Husband, throughout the course of
these proceedings, had adequate funds from his monthly salary to
pay his attorney's fees is completely contradicted by the court's
finding after trial on the merits that Husband could only afford to
pay $2,600.00 combined child support and alimony monthly whereas
its temporary order had required Husband to pay $3,134.00

for

temporary support and alimony and $318.00 for disability insurance,
a difference of $852.00. Husband's monthly deficit was covered by
accessing the Home Equity Line of Credit for about $10,000.00 which
in turn was assessed against Husband's share of property.
Husband's share of the home equity was further burdened by the
Court's failure to allocate capital gains taxes, leaving Husband
with

a

potential

$33, 600.00.27

tax

liability

upon

sale

of

the

home

of

Husband was also over-assessed $21,756.00 for non-

existent personal property, leaving Husband with far less than half
of the marital property.

Further, the trial court's allocation of

the final child support and alimony award left Husband with little
disposable income. (R. 1639-40, Finding of Fact number 9)
In considering Wife's need, the court

failed to

consider

Wife's ability to work full time due to Husband having the children
between Wednesday or Thursday afternoons and Monday mornings on
alternating weekends.

It failed to consider that Wife had received

a disproportionately high share of the property award by virtue of
Husband being awarded non-existing assets and being burdened with

27

Additionally, Husband's attorneys placed liens of $3,908.30
and $27,424.03 on Husband's home equity.
(R. 1109-10, 1307-8)
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tax liabilities.28

It ignored Wife's tax free award of $125, 0IL4-J5£APPFAI *%

in home equity29 and of nearly $139,000.00 of retirement funds.
Therefore,

the

trial

court

erred

in

finding

that

Wife

had

a

financial need to assistance with attorney's fees.
However, Finding of Fact number 19 refers to Husband making
five different applications for relief from the temporary support
awards, but fails to identify how much of the total $15,000.00 fees
were attributable to such applications.

Husband, in continued

financial distress, did ask the court on four or five occasions to
reduce his temporary support burden.30 (R. 183-190, 200, 280, 281287,

347,

359-363,

534-549,

1138-1143)

The

trial

court's

determination, following trial on the merits, that Husband was able
to pay only $2,600.00 per month combined child support and alimony
rather than -$£-r^-34.00 per month confirmed that Husband was indeed
A

in financial distress and that his applications were made in good
faith, as were husband's motions to increase the Home Equity Line
of Credit. (R. 593, 754, 1138-1143)
28

Husband was over-assessed $21,756.50 in the personal property
settlement and left with $33,600 in capital gains tax liability.
See Points I and II,
supra.
29

$385,000 appraised value of home less $176,165 mortgage
balance less $18,000 IRA related taxes divided by two equals
$95,417.50. To this from Husband's share of the home equity Wife
received $29,597 to "balance" the personal property award, thus
leaving Wife $125,014.50 of tax-free equity to be received
from the home. Husband's share of the equity after capital gains
taxes is $95,417.50-$29,597-$33,600 [capital gain taxes]=32,220.50
30

The last occasion was after trial and before the trial court
entered its minute entry decision when Husband was again unable to
make the house payment and again asked permission to increase the
line of credit to $30,000. (R. 1138-41)
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Further,

Husband's

requests

for

relief

were

often

made

ancillary to other motions for other relief which Wife was bound to
respond to anyway. (R. 183-190, 200, 280, 534-549)
Even if Husband were, arguendo,
for

relief

too many

deemed to have asked the court

times, there was no breakdown

in Wife's

counsel's proffer regarding her attorney's fees as to which portion
of

the

$15,000.00

related

relief. (R. 2450-1) 31
in attorney's
wherein

the

to Husband's

repeated

requests

for

For example, Wife was awarded only $500.00

fees after the hearing dated November 28, 1994,

trial

court

also considered

visitation and access to a computer.

other

(R. 280)

issues

such as

Therefore, if a

portion of the attorney's fees award were not vacated because this
Court

were

concerned

that Husband's

repeated

applications

for

relief may not have been necessary, the matter would need to be
remanded

for

clarification

of

the

actual

portion

of

fees

attributable to Husband's requests for relief and any fees related
to Husband's failure to comply with discovery requests. The matter
would also require the trial court to first find that Husband's
conduct was in bad faith under Rule 11, URCP, in order to justify
the award of attorney's fees in light of Wife's clear lack of
need.32
The trial court abused its discretion in finding need on the

31

Husband stipulated that Wife's overall proffer of attorney's
fees was related to work performed.
(R. 2451)
32

Given the trial court's determination that Husband's
temporary support order was in fact $537 too high each month, there
is a dearth of evidence to support a finding of bad faith.
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part of Wife, in failing to consider its inadequate property award
to Husband and in failing to consider the lack of evidence of fees
attributable to Husband's repeated applications for relief, if such
were deemed improper.

CONCLUSION
Husband has not challenged the decree granting each party a
divorce.

However, the other rulings of the trial court addressed

herein must be reversed and the case remanded.

The trial court

must be instructed to properly credit husband's property settlement
$21,756.50, to order Wife to be responsible for one-half of the
capital gains taxes from the sale of the home, to order Wife to be
responsible for one-half of the home equity loan balance between
$14,000.00 and $25,435.00 [($25,435.00-$14,000.00)/2 = $5,717.50] , to
impute full-time income to Wife for purposes of child support and
alimony, to allocate child support pro rata on the parties' incomes
at a maximum income of $10,000.00, to award Husband the tax
dependency exemptions, and to order Wife to pay her own attorney's
fees.
DATED this

day of June, 1997.

PAUL W. MORTENS EN
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

T i t l e 30-3-5 Utah Code, a s amended.

EXHIBIT B

Title 78-45-7 Utah Code, as amended.

EXHIBIT C

26 U.S.C. § 1

EXHIBIT D

26 U.S.C. § 1034
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
lb) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
fii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
Cd) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January i, 1994. that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional 57 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recover:/ Services within the Department of Human Sen/ices for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for ail or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
16) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other Dartv's failure to Drovide or exercise court-ordered visitation.

EXHIBIT A

'7) I'a; The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
i"i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or abilitvr to produce income;
•:'iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
!'iv) the length of the marriage.
i'bi The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a.). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
''g; (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii; The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
('iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A; The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
<B> The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paving alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.

EXHIBIT A

78-45-7.

Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.

(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior
court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on
the part of the obligor or obligee.
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a material
change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child
support award required by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's
voluntary reduction of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing
award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn:
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties: and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of
others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this
chapter.

EXHIBIT B

26 USCS § 1

INCOME TAXES

"U. General stock ownership corporations."
In 1982, P.L. 97-354, Sec. 5(b), amended Subchapter S.
Prior to amendment, Subchapter S read as follows: "S. Election of certain small business
corporations as to taxable status."
In 1978, P.L. 95-600, Sec. 601(c)(1), added Subchapter U.
In 1962, P.L. 87-834, added subchapter T.
In 1960, P.L. 86-779, added to subchapter M the words "and real estate investment trusts."
In 1958, P.L. 85-866, added subchapter S.

SUBCHAPTER A. Determination of Tax Liability
Part
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

Tax on individuals.
Tax on corporations.
Changes in rates during a taxable year.
Credits against tax.
Repealed.
Minimum tax for tax preferences.
Environment tax.

HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
In 1986, P.L. 99-499, Sec. 516(b)(5), added Part VII.
In 1976, P.L. 94-455, Sec. 1901(b)(2), deleted Part V.
In 1969, P.L. 91-172, Sec. 301(b)(1), added Part VI.
In 1968, P.L. 90-364, added Part V.
PART I.

TAX ON INDIVIDUALS

Sec.
1. Tax imposed.
2. Definitions and special rules.
3. Tax tables for individuals having taxable income of less than $20,000
4. Repealed.
5. Cross references relating to tax on individuals.
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
In 1976, P.L. 94-455, Sec. 501(c)(1), amended item 3 and deleted item 4, which previously
read "Optional tax tables for individuals" and "Rules for optional tax," respectively.
In 1969, P.L. 91-172, Sec. 803(d)(9), amended items 2 and 3 which previously read "Tax in
case of joint return or return of surviving spouse." and "Optional tax if adjusted gross income
is less than $5,000." respectively.
§ 1. Tax imposed.
(a) Married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses. There is hereby imposed on
the taxable income of—
(1) every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who makes a single return jointly
with his spouse under section 6013, and
(2) every surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)), a tax determined in accordance with
the following table:
If taxable income is:
Not over $36,900
Over $36,900 but not over $89,150

The tax is:
15% of taxable income.
$5,535, plus 28% of the excess over
$36,900.
Over $89,150 but not over $140,000
$20,165, plus 31% of the excess over
$89,150.
Over $140,000 but not over $250,000
$35,928.50, plus 36% of the excess over
$140,000.
Over $250,000
$75,528.50, plus 39.6% of the excess over
$250,000.
(b) Heads of households. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every head of a
household (as defined in section 2(b)) a tax determined in accordance with the following table:
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If taxable income is:
Not over $29,600
Over $29,600 but not over $76,400
Over $76,400 but not over $127,500

INTERNAL R E V E N U E CODE
The tax is:
15% of taxable income.
$4,440, plus 28% of the excess
$29,600.
$17,544, plus 31 % of the excess

over
over

$76,400.

Over $127,500 but not over $250,000

$33,385,

plus

36%

of

the

excess

over

plus

39.6%

of

the

excess

over

$127,500.

Over $250,000

$77,485,
$250,000.

(c) Unmarried individuals (other than surviving spouses and heads of households). There is
hereby imposed on the taxable income of every individual (other than a surviving spouse as
defined in section 2(a) or the head of a household as defined in section 2(b)) who is not a married individual (as defined in section 7703) a tax determined in accordance with the following
table:
If taxable income is:
Not over $22,100
Over $22,100 but not over $53,500

The tax is:
15% of taxable income.
$3,315, plus 28% of

the

excess

over

the

excess

over

$31,172, plus 36% of the excess
$115,000.
$79,772, plus 39.6% of the excess

over

$22,100.

Over $53,500 but not over $115,000

$12,107,

plus

31%

of

$53,500.

Over $115,000 but not over $250,000
Over $250,000

over

$250,000.

(d) Married individuals filing separate returns. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income
of every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who does not make a single return
jointly with his spouse under section 6013, a tax determined in accordance with the following
table:
If taxable income is:
Not over $18,450
Over $18,450 but not over $44,575
Over $44,575 but not over $70,000
Over $70,000 but not over $125,000

The tax is:
15% of taxable income.
$2,767.50, plus 28% of the excess over
$18,450.
$10,082.50, plus 31% of the excess over
$44,575.
$17,964.25, plus 36% of the excess over
$70,000.

Over $125,000

$37,764.25, plus 39.6% of the excess over
$125,000.

(e) Estates and trusts. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of—
(1) every estate, and
(2) every trust,
taxable under this subsection a tax determined in accordance with the following table:
If taxable income is:
Not over $1,500
Over $1,500 but not over $3,500
Over $3,500 but not over $5,500
Over $5,500 but not over $7,500
Over $7,500

The tax is:
15 % of taxable income.
S225, plus 28% of the excess over $1,500.
$785, plus 31 % of the excess over $3,500.
$1,405, plus 36% of the excess over $5,500.
$2,125, plus 39.6% of the excess

over

$7,500.

(f) Adjustments in tax tables so that inflation will not result in tax increases. (1) In general*
Not later than December 15 of 1993, and each subsequent calendar year, the Secretary shall
prescribe tables which shall apply in lieu of the tables contained in subsections (a), (b), (c),
(d), and (e) with respect to taxable years beginning in the succeeding calendar year.
(2) Method of prescribing tables. The table which under paragraph (1) is to apply in lieu oi
14

EXHIBIT C

INCOME TAXES

26 USCS § 1

the table contained in subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), as the case may be, with respect to
taxable years beginning in any calendar year shall be prescribed—
(A) by increasing the minimum and maximum dollar amounts for each rate bracket for
which a tax is imposed under such table by the cost-of-living adjustment for such
calendar year,
(B) by not changing the rate applicable to any rate bracket as adjusted under subparagraph (A), and
(C) by adjusting the amounts setting forth the tax to the extent necessary to reflect the
adjustments in the rate brackets.
(3) Cost-of-living adjustment. For purposes of paragraph (2), the cost-of-living adjustment
for any calendar year is the percentage (if any) by which—
(A) the CPI for the preceding calendar year, exceeds
(B) the CPI for the calendar year 1992.
(4) CPI for any calendar year. For purposes of paragraph (3), the CPI for any calendar year
is the average of the Consumer Price Index as of the close of the 12-month period ending
on August 31 of such calendar year.
(5) Consumer price index. For purposes of paragraph (4), the term ''Consumer Price Index'*
means the last Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the Department
of Labor. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the revision of the Consumer Price Index
which is most consistent with the Consumer Price Index for calendar year 1986 shall be
used.
(6) Rounding. (A) In general. If any increase determined under paragraph (2)(A), section
63(c)(4), section 68(b)(2) or section 151(d)(4) is not a multiple of $50, such increase shall
be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.
(B) Table for married individuals filing separately. In the case of a married individual
filing a separate return, subparagraph (A) (other than with respect to subsection (c)(4)
of section 63 (as it applies to subsections (c)(5)(A) and (f) of such section) and section
151(d)(4)(A)) shall be applied by substituting "$25" for "$50" each place it appears.
(7) Special rule for certain brackets. (A) Calendar year 1994. In prescribing the tables under
paragraph (1) which apply with respect to taxable years beginning in calendar year 1994,
the Secretary shall make no adjustment to the dollar amounts at which the 36 percent
rate bracket begins or at which the 39.6 percent rate begins under any table contained
in subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e).
(B) Later calendar years. In prescribing tables under paragraph (1) which apply with
respect to taxable years beginning in a calendar year after 1994, the cost-of-living adjustment used in making adjustments to the dollar amounts referred to in subparagraph (A)
shall be determined under paragraph (3) by substituting "1993" for "1992".
(g) Certain unearned income of minor children taxed as if parent's income. (1) In general. In
the case of any child to whom this subsection applies, the tax imposed by this section shall
be equal to the greater of—
(A) the tax imposed by this section without regard to this subsection, or
(B) the sum of—
(i) the tax which would be imposed by this section if the taxable income of such child
for the taxable year were reduced by the net unearned income of such child, plus
(ii) such child's share of the allocable parental tax.
(2) Child to whom subsection applies. This subsection shall apply to any child for any taxable year if—
(A) such child has not attained age 14 before the close of the taxable year, and
(B) either parent of such child is alive at the close of the taxable year.
(3) Allocable parental tax. For purposes of this subsection—
(A) In general. The term "allocable parental tax" means the excess of—
(i) the tax which would be imposed by this section on the parent's taxable income if
such income included the net unearned income of all children of the parent to whom
this subsection applies, over
(ii) the tax imposed by this section on the parent without regard to this subsection.
For purposes of clause (i), net unearned income of all children of the parent shall not be
taken into account in computing any exclusion, deduction, or credit of the parent.
(B) Child's share. A child's share of any allocable parental tax of a parent shall be equal
to an amount which bears the same ratio to the total allocable parental tax as the child's
net unearned income bears to the aggregate net unearned income of all children of such
parent to whom this subsection applies.
(C) Coordination with section 644. If tax is imposed under section 644(a)(1) with respect
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to the sale or exchange of any property of which the parent was the transferor, for
purposes of applying subparagraph (A) to the taxable year of the parent in which such
sale or exchange occurs—
(i) taxable income of the parent shall be increased by the amount treated as included
in gross income under section 644(a)(2)(A)(i), and
(ii) the amount described in subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be increased by the amount of
the excess referred to in section 644(a)(2)(A).
(D) Special rule where parent has different taxable year. Except as provided in regulations, if the parent does not have the same taxable year as the child, the allocable parental
tax shall be determined on the basis of the taxable year of the parent ending in the child's
taxable year.
(4) Net unearned income. For purposes of this subsection—
(A) In general. The term "net unearned income" means the excess of—
(i) the portion of the adjusted gross income for the taxable year which is not attributable to earned income (as defined in section 911(d)(2)), over
(ii) the sum of—
(I) the amount in effect for the taxable year under section 63(c)(5)(A) (relating to
limitation on standard deduction in the case of certain dependents), plus
(II) the greater of the amount described in subclause (I) or, if the child itemizes
his deductions for the taxable year, the amount of the itemized deductions allowed
by this chapter for the taxable year which are directly connected with the production of the portion of adjusted gross income referred to in clause (i).
(B) Limitation based on taxable income. The amount of the net unearned income for any
taxable year shall not exceed the individual's taxable income for such taxable year.
(5) Special rules for determining parent to whom subsection applies. For purposes of this
subsection, the parent whose taxable income shall be taken into account shall be—
(A) in the case of parents who are not married (within the meaning of section 7703), the
custodial parent (within the meaning of section 152(e)) of the child, and
(B) in the case of married individuals filing separately, the individual with the greater
taxable income.
(6) Providing of parent's TIN. The parent of any child to whom this subsection applies for
any taxable year shall provide the TIN of such parent to such child and such child shall
include such TIN on the child's return of tax imposed by this section for such taxable year.
(7) Election to claim certain unearned income of child on parent's return. (A) In general.
If—
(i) any child to whom this subsection applies has gross income for the taxable year
only from interest and dividends (including Alaska Permanent Fund dividends),
(ii) such gross income is more than the amount described in paragraph (4)(A)(ii)(I)
and less than 10 times the amount so described,
(iii) no estimated tax payments for such year are made in the name and TIN of such
child, and no amount has been deducted and withheld under section 3406, and
(iv) the parent of such child (as determined under paragraph (5)) elects the application of subparagraph (B),
such child shall be treated (other than [for] purposes of this paragraph) as having no
gross income for such year and shall not be required to file a return under section 6012.
(B) Income included on parent's return. In the case of a parent making the election
under this paragraph—
(i) the gross income of each child to whom such election applies (to the extent the
gross income of such child exceeds twice the amount described in paragraph
(4)(A)(ii)(I)) shall be included in such parent's gross income for the taxable year,
(ii) the tax imposed by this section for such year with respect to such parent shall be
the amount equal to the sum of—
(I) the amount determined under this section after the application of clause (i),
plus
(II) for each such child. 15 percent of the lesser of the amount described in
paragraph (4)(A)(ii)(I) or the excess of the gross income of such child over the
amount so described, and
(iii) any interest which is an item of tax preference under section 57(a)(5) of the child
shall be treated as an item of tax preference of such parent (and not of such child).
(C) Regulations. The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph.
(h) Maximum capital gains rate. If a taxpayer has a net capital gain for any taxable year, then
the tax imposed by this section shall not exceed the sum of—
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(1) a tax computed at the rates and in the same manner as if this subsection had not been
enacted on the greater of—
(A) taxable income reduced by the amount of the net capital gain, or
(B) the amount of taxable income taxed at a rate below 28 percent, plus
(2) a tax of 28 percent of the amount of taxable income in excess of the amount determined
under paragraph (1).
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the net capital gain for any taxable year shall be
reduced (but not below zero) by the amount which the taxpayer elects to take into account as
investment income for the taxable year under section 163(d)(4)(B)(iii).
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
In 1996, P.L. 104-188, Sec. 1704(m)(l), (2) (applicable as provided by Sec. 1704(m)(4) of
P.L. 104-188, which appears as a note to this section), amended subsec. (g)(7) by substituting cl. (ii) of subpara. (A) for one which read: "(ii) such gross income is more than $500 and
less than $5,000,", by substituting "twice the amount described in paragraph (4)(A)(ii)(I)"
for "$1,000" in cl. (i) of subpara. (B), and by substituting subcl. (II) of cl. (ii) of subpara.
(B) for one which read: "(II) for each such child, the lesser of $75 or 15 percent of the excess
of the gross income of such child over $500, and".
In 1993, P.L. 103-152, Sec. 1, provides: "This Act [for full classification, consult USCS
Tables volumes] may be cited as the 'Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993'.".
P.L. 103-66, Sec. 13001(a), provides: "Short title. This chapter [Title XIII, Chapter 1; for
full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] may be cited as the 'Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993* ".
P.L. 103-66, Sec. 13201(a) (applicable to taxable years beginning after 12/31/92, as provided
by Sec. 13201(c)), substituted subsecs. (a)—(e) for ones which read:
"(a) Married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses. There is hereby imposed
on the taxable income of—
"(1) every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who makes a single return
jointly with his spouse under section 6013, and
"(2) every surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)), a tax determined in accordance
with the following table:
If taxable income is:
Not over $32,450
Over $32,450 but not over $78,400
Over $78,400

The tax is:
15% of taxable income.
$4,867.50, plus 28% of the excess over $32,450.
$17,733.50, plus 31% of the excess over $78,40C

"(b) Heads of households. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every head of
a household (as defined in section 2(b)) a tax determined in accordance with the following
table:
If taxable income is:
Not over $26,050
Over $26,050 but not over $67,200
Over $67,200

The tax is:
15% of taxable income.
$3,907.50, plus 28% of the excess over $26,500.
$15,429.50, plus 31 % of the excess over $67,200

"(c) Unmarried individuals (other than surviving spouses and heads of households). There
is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every individual (other than a surviving spouse
as defined in section 2(a) or the head of a household as defined in section 2(b)) who is not a
married individual (as defined in section 7703) a tax determined in accordance with the following table:
If taxable income is:
Not over $19,450
Over $19,450 but not over $47,050
Over $47,050

The tax is:
15% of taxable income.
$2,917.50, plus 28% of the excess over $19,450.
$10,645.50, plus 31 % of the excess over $47,050.

"(d) Married individuals filing separate returns. There is hereby imposed on the taxable
income of every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who does not make a single
return jointly with his spouse under section 6013, a tax determined in accordance with the
following table:
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§ 1034. Rollover of gain on sale of principal residence.
(a) Nonrecognition of gain. If propeny (in this section called 'old residence' ) used by the
taxpayer as his principal residence is sold by him and, within a period beginning 2 years before
the date ofsuch sale and ending 2 years after such date, property (in this section called 'new
residence') is purchased and used by the taxpayer as his principal residence, gain (if any) from
such sale shall be recognized only to the extent that the taxpayer's adjusted sales price (as
defined in subsection (b)) of the old residence exceeds the taxpayer's cost of purchasing the new
residence.
(b) Adjusted sales price defined. (1) In general. For purposes of this section, the term Adjusted
sales price' means the amount realized, reduced by the aggregate of the expenses for work
performed on the old residence in order to assist in its sale.
(2) Limitations. The reduction provided in paragraph (1) applies only to expenses—
(A) for work performed during the 90-day period ending on the day on which the
contract to sell the old residence is entered into;
(B) which are paid on or before the 30th day after the date of the sale of the old residence;
and
(C) which are
(i) not allowable as deductions in computing taxable income under section 63 (defining taxable income), and
(ii) not taken into account in computing the amount realized from the sale of the old
residence,
(c) Rules for application of section. For purposes of this section:
(1) .An exchange by the taxpayer of his residence for other property shall be treated as a
sale of such residence, and the acquisition of a residence on the exchange of property shall
be treated as a purchase of such residence.
(2) A residence any pan of which was constructed or reconstructed by the taxpayer shall
be treated as purchased by the taxpayer. In determining the taxpayer's cost of purchasing a
residence, there shall be included only so much of his cost as is attributable to the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, and improvements made which are properly chargeable
to capital account, during the period specified in subsection (a).
(3) If a residence is purchased by the taxpayer before the date of his sale of the old residence,
the purchased residence shall not be treated as his new residence if sold or otherwise
disposed of by him before the date of the sale of the old residence.
(4) If the taxpayer, during the period described in subsection (a), purchases more than one
residence which is used by him as his principal residence at some time within 2 years after
the date of the sale of the old residence, only the last of such residences so used by him after
the date of such sale shall constitute the new residence. If a principal residence is sold in a
sale to which subsection (d)(2) applies within 2 years after the sale of the old residence, tor
purposes of applying the preceding sentence with respect to the old residence, the principal
residence so sold shall be treated as the last residence used during such 2-year period.
(d) Limitation. (1) In general. Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the sale of the
taxpayer's residence if within 2 years before the date of such sale the taxpayer sold at a gatf
other propeny used by him as his principal residence, and any pan of such gain was no
recognized by reason of subsection (a).
(2) Subsequent sale connected with commencing work at new place. Paragraph (1) shall no
apply with respect to the sale of the taxpayer's residence if—
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(A) such sale was in connection with the commencement of work by the taxpayer as an
employee or as a self-employed individual at a new principal place of work n and
(B) if the residence so sold is treated as the former residence for purposes of section 217
(relating to moving expenses), the taxpayer would satisfy the conditions of subsection (c)
of section 217 (as modified by the other subsections of such section).
(e) Basis of new residence. Where the purchase of a new residence results, under subsection
(a) or under section 112(n) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, in the nonrecognition of gain
o n the sale of an old residence, in determining the adjusted basis of the new residence as of
a n y time following the sale of the old residence, the adjustments to basis shall include a reduction by an amount equal to the amount of the gain not so recognized on the sale of the old
residence. For this purpose, the amount of the gain not so recognized on the sale of the old
residence includes only so much of such gain as is not recognised by reason of the cost, up to
such time, of purchasing the new residence.
(f) Tenant-stockholder in a cooperative housing corporation. For purposes of this section, section 1016 (relating to adjustments to basis), and section 1223 (relating to holding period), references to property used by the taxpayer as his principal residence, and references to the residence
of a taxpayer, shall include stock held by a tenant-stockholder (as defined in section 216, relating to deduction for amounts representing taxes and interest paid to a cooperative housing
corporation) in a cooperative housing corporation (as defined in such section) if—
(1) in the case of stock sold, the house or apartment which the taxpayer was entitled to occupy as such stockholder was used by him as his principal residence, and
(2) in the case of stock purchased, the taxpayer used as his principal residence the house or
apartment which he was entitled to occupy as such stockholder.
(g) Husband and wife. If the taxpayer and his spouse, in accordance with regulations which
shall be prescribed by the Secretary pursuant to this subsection, consent to the application of
paragraph (2) of this subsection, then—
(1) for purposes of this section—
(A) the taxpayer's adjusted sales price of the old residence is the adjusted sales price (of
the taxpayer, or of the taxpayer and his spouse) of the old residence, and
(B) the taxpayer's cost of purchasing the new residence is the cost (to the taxpayer, his
spouse, or both) of purchasing the new residence (whether held by the taxpayer, his
spouse, or the taxpayer and his spouse); and
(2) so much of the gain on the sale of the old residence as is not recognized solely by reason
of this subsection, and so much of the adjustment under subsection (e) to the basis of the
new residence as results solely from this subsection shall be allocated between the taxpayer
and his spouse as provided in such regulations.
This subsection shall apply only if the old residence and the new residence are each used by
the taxpayer and his spouse as their principal residence. In case the taxpayer and his spouse
do not consent to the application of paragraph (2) of this subsection then the recognition of
gain on the sale of the old residence shall be determined under this section without regard to
the rules provided in this subsection. For purposes of this subsection, except to the extent
provided in regulations, in the case of an individual who dies after the date of the sale of the
old residence and is married on the date of death, consent to the application of paragraph (2)
by such individual's spouse and use of the new residence as the principal residence of such
spouse shall be treated as consent and use by such individual.
(h) Members of armed forces. (1) In general. The running of any period of time specified in
subsection (a) or (c) (other than the 2 years referred to in subsection (c)(4)) shall be
suspended during any time that the taxpayer (or his spouse if the old residence and the new
residence are each used by the taxpayer and his spouse as their principal residence) serves
on extended active duty with the Armed Forces of the United States after the date of the
sale of the old residence, except that any such period of time as so suspended shall not
extend beyond the date 4 years after the date of the sale of the old residence.
(2) Members stationed outside the United States or required to reside in government
quarters. In the case of any taxpayer who, during any period of time the running of which
is suspended by paragraph (1)—
(A) is stationed outside of the United States, or
(B) after returning from a tour of duty outside of the United States and pursuant to a
determination by the Secretary7 of Defense that adequate off-base housing is not available
at a remote base site, is required to reside in on-base Government quarters,
any such period of time as so suspended shall not expire before the day which is 1 year after
the last day described in subparagraph (A) or (B), as the case may be, except that any such
period of time as so suspended shall not extend beyond the date which is 8 years after the
date of the sale of the old residence.
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(3) Extended active duty defined. For purposes of this subsection, the term 'extended active
duty' means any period of active duty pursuant to a call or order to such duty for a period
in excess of 90 days or for an indefinite period.
(i) Special rule for condemnation. In the case of the seizure, requisition, or condemnation of a
residence, or the sale or exchange of a residence under threat or imminence thereof, the provisions of this section, in lieu of section 1033 (relating to involuntary- conversions), shall be applicable if the taxpayer so elects. If such election is made, such seizure, requisition, or
condemnation shall be treated as the sale of the residence. Such election shall be made at such
time and in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe by regulations,
(j) Statute of limitations. If the taxpayer during a taxable year sells at a gain property used by
him as his principal residence, then—
(1) the statutory period for the assessment of any deficiency attributable to any part of such
gain shall not expire before the expiration of 3 years from the date the Secretary is notified
by the taxpayer (in such manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) of—
(A) the taxpayer's cost of purchasing the new residence which the taxpayer claims results
in nonrecognition of any part of such gain,
(B) the taxpayer's intention not to purchase a new residence within the period specified
in subsection (a), or
(C) a failure to make such purchase within such period; and
(2) such deficiency may be assessed before the expiration of such 3-year period notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or rule of law which would otherwise prevent such assessment.
(k) Individual whose tax home is outside the United States. The running of any period of time
specified in subsection (a) or (c) (other than the 2 years referred to in subsection (c)(4)) shall
be suspended during any time that the taxpayer (or his spouse if the old residence and the new
residence are each used by the taxpayer and his spouse as their principal residence) has a tax
home (as defined in section 911(d)(3)) outside the United States after the date of the sale of
the old residence; except that any such period of time as so suspended shall not extend beyond
the date 4 years after the date of the sale of the old residence.
(I) Cross reference. For one-time exclusion from gross income of gain from sale of principal
residence by individual who has attained age 55, see section 121.
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
In 1988, P.L. 100-647, Sec. 6002(a), added the sentence at the end of subsec. (g), effective
for sales and exchanges of old residences (within the meaning of Code Sec. 1034 of the 1986
Code) after 12/31/84, in tax. yrs. ending after 12/31/84.
In 1986, P.L. 99-514, Sec. 1878(g), substituted 'before the day which is 1 year after the last
day described' for 'before the last day described' in para, (h)(2), effective for sales of old
residences (within the meaning of Code Sec. 1034) after 7/18/84.
In 1984, P.L. 98-369, Sec. 1053(a), amended subsec. (h), effective for sales of old residences
(within the meaning of Code Sec. 1034) after 7/18/84.
Prior to amendment, subsec. (h) read as follows:
"(h) Members of Armed Forces.
"The running of any period of time specified in subsection (a) or (c) (other than the 2
years referred to in subsection (c)(4)) shall be suspended during any time that the
taxpayer (or his spouse if the old residence and the new residence are each used by the
taxpayer and his spouse as their principal residence) serves on extended active duty with
the Armed Forces of the United States after the date of the sale of the old residence
except that any such period of time as so suspended shall not extend beyond the date 4
years after the date of the sale of the old residence. For purposes of this subsection, the
term 'extended active duty' means any period of active duty pursuant to a call or order
to such duty for a period in excess of 90 days or for an indefinite period."
In 1983, P.L. 97-448, Sec. 101(d), added the two sentences at the end of Sec. 122(c) of P.L.
97-34, [the effective date for changes made by Sec. 122 of P.L. 97-34, see below].
In 1981, P.L. 97-34, Sec. 112(b)(4), substituted 'section 911(d)(3)' for 'section 9l3Q)(l)(BY
in subsec. (k), effective for tax. yrs. begin, after 12/31/81.
—P.L. 97-34, Sec. 122(a), substituted '2 years' for '18 months' each place it appeared in
Code Sec. 1034 . . . Sec. 122(b)(1), substituted '2-year' for '18-month' in para, (c)(4) . . .
Sec. 122(b)(2), repealed para, (c)(5), effective as provided in Sec. 122(c) of this Act [as
amended by Sec. 101(d) of P.L. 97-448, see above] which reads as follows:
"(c) Effective date.
"The amendments made by this section shall apply to old residences (within the meaning of section 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) sold or exchanged—
"(1) after July 20, 1981, or
"(2) on or before such date, if the rollover period under such section (determined without
regard to the amendments made by this section) expires on or after such date.
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